Does SMS offer idiotic reasons to believe God exists? SMS denying TySixtus Affirming

[BWE]

This debate is between SMS and TySixtus. It will last 3 rounds and address the question, "Does SMS offer idiotic reasons to believe God exists?"

SMS will open the debate.

3 rounds consist of an opening post, an argument and a rebuttal/closing.

Gentlemen, you may begin.

-BWE

Edit:

Word count:
3000 words in the opening statement.
2000 each in the last two statements.
Quotes from each other do not count as the word count. Quotes from sources count as part of the word count. And so do references, endnotes, footnotes, etc. __________________


eta 2: link to peanut gallery: http://talkrational.org/showthread.php?t=15131

[SMS]

The probandum is:

SMS’ COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AN IDIOTIC ARGUMENT

Hence, for Tysixtus, the probandum is not answered by arguing that my cosmological argument is merely false, misguided or structurally invalid. If Tysixtus is to make his argument, he needs to show that my cosmological argument is idiotic. In contrast, my own task is easier: I don’t need to argue that my cosmological argument is true, but only non-idiotic.

A Disembodied Mind?

At this stage of my argument, I don’t aim to show that a disembodied mind exists. My goal is humble: I aim to argue that my belief that a disembodied mind is a possible existent is rationally believed on a prima facie basis.

Conceiving a Disembodied Mind

A disembodied mind (consciousness) is intelligible to me. (1) This is to say that a ’disembodied mind’ is not a meaningless conjunction of words. Moreover, after thorough investigation, I can conceive a disembodied mind. This is not to say that after a thorough investigation my conceiving of an x entails the possibility of that x. Instead, I believe that (after thorough investigation) my conceiving of an x is sufficient reason for me to believe that x is possible on a prima facie basis. (2) Hence, when I declare that my conceivability of an x is grounds for my believing that x is logically possible, I declare it only as a conversation starter and not as a conversation ender. In sum, you could sketch my position as this: After a thorough investigation, I find a disembodied mind to be epistemically possible. Hence, it is prima facie reasonable for me to believe that a disembodied mind is logically possible.

This form of reasoning is generally allowed within philosophical circles, and so I will assume it is also permissible within this discussion.

Potential Complications for Tysixtus

Assuming that Tysixtus wishes to challenge the possibility or plausibility of a disembodied mind, I suspect that he will argue from what we know about minds. I further suspect that he may argue from some scientific basis about how consciousness works and so forth. But he has a gap to overcome: How can he affirm (from a scientific basis) that what is true for the mind within the natural arena confers its truth to an alleged supernatural arena? He could try to argue that certain natural laws, conditions or regularities make it impossible or implausible that a mind is disembodied. However, this type of impossibility or implausibility extends no further than the natural arena or those worlds relevantly like the natural arena. Hence, Tysixtus could not affirm:

1. (x) (Mx &~Nx)→Ex
Whatever is a mind and not-naturalistic is embodied.

from

2. (x)(Mx&Nx)→Ex

Whatever is a mind and naturalistic is embodied.

For the purposes of our debate, I’m quite willing to accept 2! Exactly how he will argue, if at all, that 1 is true is beyond my ken. But I can make a guess: Tysixtus may argue that a mind is essentially embodied. However, the essentialist position rests on essentialism. Essentialism belongs to the realm of metaphysics and modal logics; it’s a position that cannot be sufficiently supported by mere scientific evidence. So it will be interesting to see how, if at all, Tysixtus tackles the issue of a possibly or actually existing disembodied mind.

A Cosmological Argument (3)

The cosmological argument I herein offer is from philosophers Gale and Pruss. I do not go as far as to say that their argument proves the existence of God with certainty. Instead I assert that their argument is rational and non-idiotic. Here we go...

A possible world is a compossible conjunction of abstract propositions. In every possible world, either s is a member of its conjunction of abstract propositions or not-s is a conjunction of its abstract propositions (the principle of bivalence). The actual world is just a compossible conjunction of instantiated abstract propositions. In any possible world there are necessary propositions such as 2+2=4 or that married men are not bachelors. Many worlds will also contain contingent propositions; it is these contingent propositions that individuate the possible worlds from each other (since necessary or impossible statements are possessed by all worlds). Thus,

3. If the contingently true proposition conjunction in any world, w1, is identical to the contingently true proposition conjunction in any other world, w2, then w1=w2.

Now let us call the actual world’s contingent truth conjunction p. Let us examine a premise:

4. For any p and world w, if p is in w’s contingently true conjunction, there is some possible world w1 and proposition q, such that w1’s contingently true conjunction contains q, p, r, and the proposition that q explains p = r.

(p)(w)(p∈w)→◊[{(∃x)(∃y)(∃z) x=w1, y=q, x=r & (p,r,q∈w1)} & r = (q Ex.p)]

This seems harmless enough! All this states is that for every contingently true proposition, there is at least some logically possible explanation for it. It would be burdensome to find a reason to deny this modest premise. I herein assume that such a weak premise is prima facie acceptable. And by some instantations, we can deduce 5 from 4.

5. If p is the actual world’s contingently true conjunction, then there is some possible world w1 which contains p, q, r and the proposition that q explains p= r.

(p∈w)→◊[{w1 & (p,r,q ∈w1)} & r = (q Ex.p)]

Since we are treating p as the actual world’s contingently true conjunction, we can affirm that-

6. Possibly, there is some world w1 which contains p, q r and the proposition that q explains p.

◊[{w1 & (p,r,q ∈w1)} & r = (q Ex.p)]

Recall my earlier claim that individuated worlds are only so by their contingently true propositions. This claim is important because it leads us to affirm that w1 is equivalent to the actual world. Consider the following: recall that I said w1 possesses p; p is the contingently true conjunction of the actual world. Now recall that all propositions are either true or false in any world. Hence, if w1 possessed any proposition r or q, then r or q are both either true or false in the actual world. But also take note that any proposition found in the actual world’s contingently true conjunction is also found in w1.

Therefore, any proposition found in w1 must be either true or false in p. Since worlds that possess contradictions must be impossible worlds, then w1 cannot have any proposition that p does not have, and p cannot have any proposition that w1 does not have. Thus w1 is the actual world:

7. w=w1

Hence there is an actual explanation, q, and q actually explains p.

8. (p,r,q)∈w & r=(qEx.p)

And what kind of explanation is q? Our current inventory of possible explanation types seem to fall into two categories: personal or those that are (in principle) subject to science. Hence, q is either a personal explanation (an intentional action of some agent) or an explanation subject to, in principle, the sciences. (4)

Yet if q were a scientific-type explanation, then it would explain p in terms of some law-like propositions. It seems evident enough that law-like propositions although nomologically necessary are not logically necessary (or impossible) and hence such laws are logically contingent. Since such laws are logically contingent, they are members of p. It’s obvious that no such a nomological member(s) of p can explain every other member of p and itself.

Thence, q is a personal explanation; it is an intentional act. The agent in the personal explanation is either contingent, impossible or necessary. The agent obviously cannot be impossible, but neither is it contingent because if it were then its existence would be a member of p; but an intentional act of an agent cannot explain the contingency of that same agent since q presupposes that agent’s existence. Thus q is the intentional act of some necessary agent.

Is q necessary or contingent? Let’s assume that q is necessary. Hence q is a conjunct in the conjunctions of all possible worlds. It follows that p is necessary too because the necessary agent intends that p to obtain. But if p is in all possible worlds, then (recall our earlier reasoning from premise 6 to 7 & 8) the actual world is necessary. This is to say that there are no other ways the world could have been. But that’s nonsense! Thus, q is contingent.

Now that we have determined that q is a contingent intentional act, we need to ask whether q is freely or unfreely intended. Let’s assume q is unfreely intended. This would mean that there is some other proposition that explains the necessary being’s intended act such as some psychological fact or external to the necessary being. Such a proposition is either contingent or necessary. Let’s call this proposition ‘k’.

If k is necessary, then k necessitates what it explains ( proposition q); yet that cannot be the case since we already determined that q was contingent. Hence, k, if true, is only contingently true. If k is contingently true, then it belongs in p. Yet, that’s viciously circular! For on this argument, k would explain q; q would explain p and hence explain k. Because of this, it follows that q is a freely intended and contingent proposition that explains p.

You may object that since q is a member of p, then how cannot explain p. However, such an objection is incorrect given the libertarian concept of free acts. Since q is a freely intended act, it is self-explanatory on the libertarian understanding. Hence, the actual world’s contingent conjunction is explained by the free but contingent intention of a necessary and personal being.

You may further complain that appealing to a free action is not a full explanation. Because explanations aim to answer a person’s why question, we should allow that proper explanations are very context-relative. There are some cases wherein an appeal to a free action is a full explanation and there are other cases wherein it is not.

So what about my case? I herein sympathize with the objector. It seems necessary to give a fuller account as to how the intention of this being is sufficient to explain p. My answer is simple: this being is essentially omnipotent. Therefore, assuming p has a possible explanation, it is explicable merely through this being’s intent. Here’s why we should believe that the necessary being is omnipotent (5):

Obviously the being is in a power state, P, to bring about p. Let’s assume P is unessential to the being, and hence it is contingent. But this means that P is a member of p. Hence, the beings free act explains P. On this account, then, the being would have to be in a prior state of power P1 to bring it about that p and hence P. If P is not equivalent to P1, then being can possibly lack P1 (the transition from P to P1 shows that P1 is unessential to this being) then
P1 is contingent, too. If P is equivalent to P1, then it is contingent by equivocation. Thus, either way P1 is contingent.

By a repeat of the above argument, the being would have to be in P2 to cause P1, and P2 would have to come from P3, ad infinitum. But this is overly complex. It’s far easier and simpler if we assume that whatever power state that the being had to intend p is essential to this being. Hence, from the merits of the razor, we should treat P as essential to the being.

This argument gives us the conclusion that this being, which I call God, freely intended p. And what’s p? Well, p is the collection of all contingently true propositions. Because every proposition is either true or false in the actual world and the being is responsible for every contingent truth, then the being is responsible for any contingent truth (or falsehood since the two can be defined in relation to each other) of the actual world. And this is, of course, is what we call omnipotence. Thence the being is omnipotence which can explain how it is that this being can intend that p obtains. Thence, the being is omnipotent. And this explains how it is that p obtains through the being's intent.*

Thus, in conclusion, we have a personal, omnipotent, and necessary being that freely intends the contingent truths of the actual world. How do you like them apples, atheist?

Quickly and Incompletely Addressing Some Common Objections:

Is the Universe a Brute Fact?

If the universe is a brute fact, then its either necessarily so or contingently existing. If it is necessarily so and it explains p, then it is q; and q is a is true necessarily. However, if it is true necessarily and explains p, (assuming causal realism) then it entails p necessarily. This means that the effects of the universe are necessary existents and so are the effects of those effects, etc. Hence, p and its members are necessary.

The above means that p is found in all worlds and that no other world can have a state of affairs that actual world does not (See our earlier reasoning from premise 6 to 7). The actual world is the only possible world. For we all grant (and rightfully so) that some things and events are contingent. We, therefore, have good reason to deny that the universe is necessarily a brute fact. Therefore if the universe is a brute fact, then the universe is contingent.

Let’s assume now that the universe is contingent and it is a brute fact. Let’s also say that we want it to function as q. We can summarize proposition r as: ‘The existence universe is a brute fact and caused p’. Is this contingently true? If so, then it is a member of p. Yet, it cannot explain p because it cannot explain itself.

Moreover, because it is an actually inexplicable member of p, it denies premise 8. Since premise 8 was deduced from premise 1, then premise 1 is denied too. But this seems drastic because it goes as far as to deny that p has at least a logically possible explanation. Hence, on this account, it is impossible that p has an explanation. That should shake your modal intuitions and offer good prima facie reason to deny the universe as a contingently brute fact.

A Humean Objection

Humeans say that the members of p explain each other ad infinitum, and hence p is internally explained. To this, some theists respond that Humeans do not acknowledge the difference between per se and per accidens subordinated causes. Other theists, like me, say Hume’s case fails because it is possible that members of a whole be explained separately without explaining the whole.

To offer a prima facie argument for the above, consider an analogy: can I sufficiently explain the existence of a car by explaining the existence of its parts? I can't see how. Or can I explain a gathering of 100 scientists from across the world by offering a causal explanation as to how each individual scientist arrived at his or her destination? It’s doubtful. So if these cases are doubtful, and I assume you see their similarity, then why is it that Humeans believe that the whole is explained through merely explaining its parts?


The Universe: An Uncaused Cause?

Since the necessariness of the universe is taken to be q, and q entails p, then p is necessary and hence non-contingent. This criticism is the same that is the found under my earlier criticisms for a necessary universe that is a brute fact. There’s no need to rehearse the argument.

Conclusion

I know fully well that my argument can be rationally denied. But this does not mean that it cannot be rationally held by a competent thinker. If there is one thing philosophers are good at it is creating defensible holes in just about any principle. Heck, I’ve seen tenable arguments that deny the explosive logic, bivalence, matter, other people, and affirm true contradictions. Hence, I’m not worried if you, reader, find my argument unconvincing. What matters here is not whether my argument is successful but whether the argument I deploy is idiotic. It’s Ty’s task to show that my argument is idiotic. As far as I can tell, it’s a tall order to fulfill.


-----
References

(1) For a great defence of its intelligibility: Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz ‘Are Souls Intelligible?’.

(2) H Geirsson’s ‘Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Reasoning’. Stephen Yablo’s ‘Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?’.

(3)Richard Gale and Alex Pruss, ‘A New Cosmological Argument’.

(4) I confess that I’m not entirely comfortable with this disjunction. I’m unsure whether there are metaphysical explanations or explanations we know through the light of reason that are neither properly allocated as personal or scientific-type (in principle) explanations. The latter being what we can, in principle, detect or observe through the senses, etc. However, if Tysixtus proffers a third disjunct, then I’ll address its merits.

(5) Jerome Gellman, ‘Prospects for a Sound Stage 3 Cosmological Argument’.

(6) Hume’s objection has been decisively rebutted in Alexander Pruss’ ‘The Hume-Edwards Principle and the Cosmological Argument’.

*mod note: SMS asked for an edit which I granted. The old text is struck through and the new text is marked in green.
-BWE

[BWE]

SMS' post is up. TySixtus will submit his opening post next.

[TySixtus]

First of all, I would like to thank TR for hosting the debate and for BWE for moderating it. I would also like to thank SMS for participating.

The proposition I originally put forth for this debate was that SMS’s reasons for believing in God were idiotic, and that there are a few things wrong with his Cosmological argument in particular. By idiotic, I suggest his argument is not well thought out, lacks common sense, makes unwarranted extrapolations and relies to a heavy degree on the abuse of language.

SMS rightly points out that he does not have to prove his argument, only that he has to show it is not idiotic. By that same token, I do not have to disprove it, and will make no major attempt to do so – though I posit my examination of his argument will reveal it to be fatuous and silly, and more importantly, unoriginal. Unoriginality is an important criterion in this debate, because if SMS’s argument is no different than the ones that have come before it, the same objections apply. But again, while I could offer a disproof of his argument, and indeed may even do so inadvertently, it is not my primary aim.

The first noticeable issue with SMS’s argument comes in the beginning, specifically when he speaks of “disembodied minds”. SMS points out that he can conceive of a disembodied mind, but the obvious problem is this: what he can conceive of is irrelevant. To be honest, it seems like a cheap trick, a way for SMS to have an “out” when the going gets rough, because all he has to do is claim he can “conceive of it” so it’s not complete gibberish. In the spirit of charity, I will not officially accuse him of that, but instead will say that I am not sure why he saw the need to state that he can conceive of a disembodied mind. It seems redundant. Either way, it does serve as a warning to the reader – namely, that SMS is preparing us for a later encounter with silliness. He is drawing our attention to the fact that he believes disembodied minds are logically possible. This is meant to disarm us of our skepticism concerning the end of his Cosmological argument, which can only be fulfilled by a supernatural entity who (surprise) happens to be a disembodied mind. Of course, he glosses over the most important part of this extraordinarily important premise, because he doesn’t address how a disembodied mind is logically possible (let alone probable, but I’ll get there in a second). I posit that the concept of a disembodied mind is idiotic, if for no other reason than it is unscientific and completely at odds with what we know about both minds and brains.

How does he deal with this? Well, he attempts to head off my obvious objections by saying:

How can he [Ty] affirm (from a scientific basis) that what is true for the mind within the natural arena confers its truth to an alleged supernatural arena?

And we can see that SMS is no different than any garden variety Christian, who frequently uses silly postulates to buttress his or her silly arguments. SMS is quite literally suggesting that I have no right to claim that disembodied minds cannot exist, because they could be supernatural. Well, as soon as SMS is willing to include a proof for the supernatural in his argument, I will address it seriously. Until he does so, all of his philosophizing is meaningless. At the end of the day, SMS’s argument rests on the idea of magic. He realizes this, which is why he sets us up for it in the beginning, hoping we won’t notice. Or did he think the atheist was going to be okay with that “trivial detail”?

SMS has offered no conception of a disembodied mind. He has not explained how one is possible. If, like most of the scientific community, you believe that a mind is dependant upon a physical brain, speaking of disembodied minds is pure nonsense. SMS has simply asserted it is possible and labeled it as a “conversation starter”, which is quite literally idiotic. It is a laughably silly conversation ender, because he cannot offer any proof for this supernatural explanation. We’re supposed to just accept it. Does SMS think that by saying he can “Conceive of a disembodied mind” that I will not challenge it? I hereby challenge that conception, and demand to see some proof that said conception isn’t completely idiotic. He could start by showing us some evidence for a disembodied mind, or explaining a process whereby one could come to exist.

Further, I will demand to see SMS’s theory of the supernatural – how supernatural things exist, how they can be detected, what it means to be supernatural, and other relevant information. As it stands right now, SMS has left such a gigantic hole in his argument that I believe I could end my critique of his argument and have proved my point – his belief, when examined closely, relies on supernaturalism and concepts that are nothing short of silly. His argument is therefore idiotic. However, I won’t stop here; I have a few thousand words left, and I do have some more to say about his supernatural problems.

Supernatural explanations are essentially worthless hypotheses for anything because if you’re going to claim something is possible via supernatural processes, everything – including the very concept of language – now becomes meaningless. Any argument I could make, if I allowed supernatural rebuttals, could always and in every way be superseded by some magical explanation completely outside the bounds of evidence or logic. SMS can appeal to supernatural disembodied minds all he wants, but why should we bother engaging those premises? He can say whatever he wants about them, and claim he is not bound by any logical or scientific stricture because, hey, It’s Supernatural, and you silly atheists can’t use your knowledge of the natural world to draw inferences about the supernatural! How do I like those apples? I think they’re rotten. Even the worms don’t want them, and I certainly won’t touch them. Unless SMS can posit an argument for magical apples that don’t attract worms and will never decay. I might like those.

Of course, he has brought up supernatural explanations because his cosmological argument requires them. And in this regard, his argument is a flawed as Aquinas’, and boringly unoriginal. We can sum up his fancy hieroglyphics in a few sentences: This universe requires an explanation for its existence, this explanation is the act of a freely acting agent, and that agent is called God.

A simple objection to this is that the universe requires no explanation. For all I know, nothingness is impossible. To speak of a “possible world” wherein a universe doesn’t exist is an oxymoron, and completely meaningless to boot. Even the words “possible” and “world” can only be cogent when contained within a universe. There is no reason to address this silly idea of possible worlds, or to believe that anything other than the universe as it exists right now could exist. He has offered no compelling reason why I should require an explanation for the universe. There may be one, of course. But all he has done is suggested it is possible. And here we see SMS’s biggest mistake in this debate: he has applied his language in a sloppy fashion. If the English language was a woman, I would feel compelled to attend to her rescue. She is being sorely abused.

How? Well, he has essentially confused the weight of two words – “possible” and “probable”. SMS seems to think that as long as he bases his argumentation of off things that are logically possible he is saved from the charge of having idiotic beliefs. I hate to bear such sad and grumpy news, but he is pretty wrong. Plenty of things are logically possible, but are so improbable that to believe they offer compelling reasons for proposition X is quite idiotic. Further, to draw extrapolations from what is possible to what is probable changes the entire tone of your argument, and requires your opponent to adhere to a level of generosity that is nothing short of highway robbery.

Consider that it is logically possible for me to fall out of an airplane, plummet 10,000 feet, land on my stomach, bounce, brush myself off and be home in time for dinner. Nobody would deny that this is logically possible. But to suggest that parachutes are now superfluous is to confuse what is possible with what is probable. And SMS has done exactly this. He is borrowing the intellectual security of the idea called “probable” and giving it to the idea called “possible” like some botched blood transfusion performed by Dr. Nick. Hi everybody!

To wit:

Therefore, assumding p has a possible explanation, it is explicable merely through this being’s intent.

Yes, I suppose it is logically possible that a supernatural being created the universe. Is it probable? No, because he has not explained how. SMS cannot even begin to describe how it is probable, which explains his appeal to supernaturalism. Suddenly the idea of an omnipotent creator force/disembodied mind becomes palatable if you posit magic. If you stick to the facts, to logic, to common sense? Well, you might not be able to come up with a good solid answer. But that’s okay. At least you’re not suggesting supernatural flim-flammery.

And this is the whole problem with SMS’s argument. It relies on abusing the concepts of “possibility”, and takes several generous withdrawals from that very large bank account. Just because something is possible doesn’t mean you aren’t an idiot for believing it.

Other than that, his argument is unremarkable. I claimed earlier that it is unoriginal because it essentially mirrors all of the other cosmological arguments – they claim the universe requires an explanation, but of course this explanation has to be outside the universe, so we end up talking about supernatural beings. In fact, Gale and Pruss admit as much in their cosmological argument. I suppose if you’re willing to accept supernatural explanations for things, the argument works. But then, you can make any argument work by positing supernaturalism. So what is there to talk about?

I’ve left alone the rather stark – and perhaps most well known – objection to the cosmological argument, and by that I refer to the infinite regress problem. Or, as SMS is familiar with it, the Turtles Objection. In short, if you’re going to claim the universe requires an explanation, what about God? If you claim that God needs no explanation, I will then ask you to explain why the universe needs one, keeping in mind that I don’t think the universe needs one at all and I am merely humoring you. We can keep going further and further back and we will have no answer. The cosmological argument assumes the universe requires an explanation in its very premises, so I guess SMS feels like he doesn’t have to deal with that. But I hope he is not too crestfallen to learn that I am not satisfied with such an explanation, and to hand-wave this objection away is also fairly idiotic.

Of course, we all know that arguments like these are not meant to prove anything. They are meant to do exactly what SMS uses them for – to give the believer a sense that they don’t believe something silly. It is a way for someone who believes himself intellectually sophisticated to hang onto a very unsophisticated and juvenile idea. These kinds of arguments are not meant to be used in apologetics, because they really only give comfort to those people who fancy themselves enlightened. It is too much for them to say “I believe in magic”, even though that is exactly what they believe in.

This Cosmological argument will only work if you believe in supernaturalism apriori. It has to, because it does not address supernaturalism at all, but merely assumes it as a premise. As a rational human being, I cannot sit here and allow him to build his argument off of so monumental an assumption. As skeptic, I am not willing to allow – without seeing some kind of argument, or evidence – the existence of supernatural things. I feel I am on firm ground, here. My demand for some evidence of these claims is not new, and did not originate with me. In fact, this line of reasoning can be found in the atheist handbook, under the heading “Conversation Starters”.

SMS has said very little of his concept of disembodied minds. The only thing he will say is that I can’t hold him to some unfair, fuddy-duddy expectation that he place his concepts inside the natural world where they can actually be discussed. The irony here is that SMS is a naturalist – he wouldn’t be using logic and speaking of causality if he wasn’t. His problem is that he doesn’t like where his naturalism leads him. He also probably understands that he can’t start making testable claims about supernatural entities. Further, his argumentation is hypocritical. I am sure his standards only go one way. If I told him that I could provide a proof for the possible existence of a giant miniature space hamster named Boo, but that in order to do so he would have to be willing to accept supernatural premises… well, he might decide to leave me locked up in Irenicus’ dungeon. I’d be rightfully painted as an idiot. Yet for some reason, SMS thinks he can do exactly this with god as opposed hamsters. I’m not buying it. Even if it is on sale.

So in summary, I believe I have shown SMS’s cosmological argument is idiotic. It rests upon supernatural explanations for things, without giving us a good reason why we should accept them. SMS routinely conflates what is possible with what is reasonable to believe, and he does this because he knows he is on thin intellectual ice; the end of his argument – like every cosmological argument to come before this new and shiny one – relies on a supernatural being. We need to see some evidence for supernaturalism, and we need to see how supernatural beings could interact with the natural world. We must remember that his argument is not an argument for the possibility (to say nothing of the probability) of supernatural entities or processes. It’s an argument for the existence of a being that is supernatural by assertion only. SMS has claimed he doesn’t have to address this because it’s a given, but I did not give it to him. How he got it is a mystery, and I have no intention of letting him keep it.

[.π.]

EDIT: Disregard, this would be his opening post so he's got 3000 words to play with. Post is up.

TySixtus, your post is 2462 words. The limit set for the debate is 2000 words. According to the Rat Ring procedures, this requires you resubmit your post under the 2000 word limit.

(2) Exceeding the word limit:

If a participant posts a statement with a length greater than the designated word limit, the moderator's response will vary. If the statement exceeds the limit by a mere 1-10 words, then no action will be taken. If the statement is 11-100 words over, then the participant will receive a warning (future statements between 11-100 words will be declined). If the statement exceeds the limit by greater than 100 words then the statement will be declined and another one must be re-submitted.

http://talkrational.org/showthread.php?t=1680

[SMS]

And we can see that SMS is no different than any garden variety Christian, who frequently uses silly postulates to buttress his or her silly arguments. SMS is quite literally suggesting that I have no right to claim that disembodied minds cannot exist, because they could be supernatural. Well, as soon as SMS is willing to include a proof for the supernatural in his argument, I will address it seriously. Until he does so, all of his philosophizing is meaningless. At the end of the day, SMS’s argument rests on the idea of magic. He realizes this, which is why he sets us up for it in the beginning, hoping we won’t notice. Or did he think the atheist was going to be okay with that “trivial detail”?

Ty’s assessment of my argument is inaccurate. I did not say that Ty could not state that disembodied minds cannot exist because they could be supernatural. To correct Ty, I said that Ty could not deny or doubt the existence of such minds from a scientific basis. Why? Well, because science deals with the natural, not the supernatural. Analogously, no one would proclaim a 100 dollar bill is not underneath a pile of sand since that pile of sand was examined with a metal detector. And if Ty wishes to claim that the natural world is all there is for his basis against disembodied minds, then he begs the question.

SMS has offered no conception of a disembodied mind. He has not explained how one is possible. If, like most of the scientific community, you believe that a mind is dependant upon a physical brain, speaking of disembodied minds is pure nonsense. SMS has simply asserted it is possible and labeled it as a “conversation starter”, which is quite literally idiotic. It is a laughably silly conversation ender, because he cannot offer any proof for this supernatural explanation. We’re supposed to just accept it. Does SMS think that by saying he can “Conceive of a disembodied mind” that I will not challenge it? I hereby challenge that conception, and demand to see some proof that said conception isn’t completely idiotic. He could start by showing us some evidence for a disembodied mind, or explaining a process whereby one could come to exist.

I’m unsure what Ty means by asking me to explain how a disembodied mind is possible. But, if I understand him correctly, then I think he’s misinterpreting my argument. For within the beginning stages of my argument, I do not need to offer a “proof” for the supernatural. I argue that after a thorough investigation, I found nothing logically impossible about its existence. And hence I treat the existence of a disembodied mind as logically possible. I admit that there is no proof for a disembodied mind to be found here. This is an entirely tentative position based upon an educated epistemic possibility. Remeber that at this stage of my argument I am not aiming to prove the existence of the supernatural. Instead I am trying to show that it is reasonable to believe the supernatural is possible.

Further, I will demand to see SMS’s theory of the supernatural – how supernatural things exist, how they can be detected, what it means to be supernatural, and other relevant information. As it stands right now, SMS has left such a gigantic hole in his argument that I believe I could end my critique of his argument and have proved my point – his belief, when examined closely, relies on supernaturalism and concepts that are nothing short of silly. His argument is therefore idiotic. However, I won’t stop here; I have a few thousand words left, and I do have some more to say about his supernatural problems.

I’m unsure what Ty means when he asks for my interpretation of how a supernatural thing exists. What does it mean to ask: How does some supernatural x exist? I understand what it means to ask why something exists, but what does he mean by asking me how something exists?Perhaps Ty can be more specific in his subsequent posts.

Ty also asks how does person detect the supernatural. I believe that we can deduce that there is a supernatural cause by means of eliminating the competing causal explanations. In this way, a supernatural cause is detected by the implausibility of any other competing causal explanation. In fact, my cosmological argument aims to do just that. So it’s odd that Ty would ask me such a question. Perhaps he means to ask how else can the supernatural be detected.

Finally Ty asks what it means for an x to be supernatural. This answer is easy: One tentative but acceptable definition of a supernatural x would be an entity or realm which need not or does not adhere to the nomological laws that structure our natural world.

Supernatural explanations are essentially worthless hypotheses for anything because if you’re going to claim something is possible via supernatural processes, everything – including the very concept of language – now becomes meaningless. Any argument I could make, if I allowed supernatural rebuttals, could always and in every way be superseded by some magical explanation completely outside the bounds of evidence or logic.

I deny that supernatural explanations transcend the laws of logic. There are no possible worlds that transcend logic, and hence there are no supernatural explanations that transcend logic. Moreover, it is simply question begging to state that supernatural explanations are outside the bounds of evidence. You need to support these contentions, Ty. But if by “evidence” you mean “scientific evidence”, then some clarification is in need. Supernatural explanations cannot be falsified by naturalistic evidence. I take this to be obvious and to say otherwise is to commit a fallacious category error. However, this does not mean that supernatural explanations cannot be deduced or induced by the implausibility of naturalistic explanations. If, for instance, we have sufficient naturalistic evidence that no naturalistic explanation sufficiently explains some x, then we can induce a supernatural explanation (assuming such an explanation is logically possible).

Of course, he has brought up supernatural explanations because his cosmological argument requires them. And in this regard, his argument is a flawed as Aquinas’, and boringly unoriginal. We can sum up his fancy hieroglyphics in a few sentences: This universe requires an explanation for its existence, this explanation is the act of a freely acting agent, and that agent is called God.

Though I make no claim to originality, the argument bears very little similarity to Aquinas’ argument. I take this to be obvious to those educated in Aquinas’ thought. Anyhow, Ty’s portrayal of my argument is inaccurate. Pace Ty, I show that if it is logically possible that the conjunction of contingently true propositions have an explanation, then such a conjunction does have an explanation. From there I performed a series of valid deductions as to what type of explanation was needed or likely, and arrived at my conclusion of a necessary personal being that freely intended the conjunction of the contingently true propositions. In contrast, Ty’s version of my argument is structurally invalid and inaccurate.

A simple objection to this is that the universe requires no explanation. For all I know, nothingness is impossible. To speak of a “possible world” wherein a universe doesn’t exist is an oxymoron, and completely meaningless to boot. Even the words “possible” and “world” can only be cogent when contained within a universe. There is no reason to address this silly idea of possible worlds, or to believe that anything other than the universe as it exists right now could exist. He has offered no compelling reason why I should require an explanation for the universe.

But I dealt with your first objection, Ty. I showed that if we are to hold that the universe has no explanation, then we must also hold—but virtue of logical deduction—that the universe has no logically possible explanation. But this is a heavy modal claim that demands argument! You cannot just assert it, Ty. And if you wish to argue that the universe is necessary and without explanation, then, as I deductively argued, there are no contingencies. But this is also a heavy modal claim that needs support, too! Yet, you offer no argument for either position.

Even if nothingness is impossible, it does not follow that this universe is necessary. You see, Ty, even if I grant you that the words “possible” and “world” are only cogent within a universe, it does not mean that such words are only cogent within this universe. And it’s this universe that’s at stake here: the relevant question is whether this universe is necessary. The question is not whether a universe is necessary. And as I have argued, it is this universe that needs an explanation.

I think it’s worth quoting Ty again:

There is no reason to address this silly idea of possible worlds, or to believe that anything other than the universe as it exists right now could exist.

I’m unsure if Ty knows what he is saying here. Ty’s claim amounts to saying that we have no reason to believe that the universe, as it exists now, is not necessary. Yet, this is so very odd since I have offered good reason to believe otherwise. For I have argued that if the universe is necessary and it causally explains the facts of the world, then it necessitates those effects. Hence there are no contingencies on this account! This means that the facts of the world such as Plato being Aristotle’s teacher are necessarily true. But, this is absurd. Surely we grant that things could have been otherwise. Hence, we grant that the universe is not necessary. Ty needs to deal with the argument I gave in my OP. He cannot just ignore them.

How? Well, he has essentially confused the weight of two words – “possible” and “probable”. SMS seems to think that as long as he bases his argumentation of off things that are logically possible he is saved from the charge of having idiotic beliefs. I hate to bear such sad and grumpy news, but he is pretty wrong. Plenty of things are logically possible, but are so improbable that to believe they offer compelling reasons for proposition X is quite idiotic. Further, to draw extrapolations from what is possible to what is probable changes the entire tone of your argument, and requires your opponent to adhere to a level of generosity that is nothing short of highway robbery.

This is another mischaracterization of my argument. I do not argue that God is possible and confuse that with probability. I first argued that a disembodied mind is logically possible. From there my cosmological argument argued that a disembodied mind is the probable explanation for the conjunction of the contingently true facts of the world. Hence the existence of a disembodied mind is probable. And I argued its plausibility by negating the alternative explanations such as a necessary universe or a contingent universe. Think of it like this: the possibility of a disembodied mind enabled me to throw its hat into the mix of explanations. From there I negated the competing explanations until I deduced a personal and disembodied mind as the remaining explanation. There’s no confusion of possibility and probability here, folks. The confusion is Ty’s, not mine.

This Cosmological argument will only work if you believe in supernaturalism apriori. It has to, because it does not address supernaturalism at all, but merely assumes it as a premise.

I’d love to see Ty pinpoint a specific premise within my argument that assumes the supernatural.

Conclusion

Ty proclaims that I haven't argued why we should believe that the universe has an explanation or why it is not necessary. Yet, this is blatantly false. It's right there in my OP! I suggest Ty reads it.

[TySixtus]

The problem with SMS’s cosmological argument – or rather Gale and Pruss' argument – is, as I stated in my first post, it is nothing new. It fails for all the same reasons that the other cosmological arguments fail. Just because the facts of this universe could’ve been different, doesn’t mean the universe could have not existed. As with all the cosmological arguments, we are given a false dichotomy to choose from. Either the universe exists this way, or it couldn’t have existed at all. I’m not convinced that this is the case. For all I know, nothingness is impossible. The universe could be necessary and the facts of the universe could be anything after that. It is enough for me to say that I don’t know, but I do not accept the reasoning that the universe could not exist. As I said, this is but one of many ways to cast doubt on the various cosmological arguments.

And it’s this universe that’s at stake here: the relevant question is whether this universe is necessary. The question is not whether a universe is necessary.

This is a fundamental flaw in SMS’s argument. For all I know, no other universe but this one could’ve existed. I don’t have to present an argument for it in this debate. Further, SMS claims that if the universe has no logically possible explanation, I have to present an argument. Again, I do not have to do this, at least not in this debate. But I will suggest that logically possible explanations exist within the universe, and not outside of it. I have no idea what the universe, at the exact moment of its inception – if, indeed, there was a moment of inception – was subject to. I’m not even going to speculate. I don’t have to. There could be a perfectly natural explanation for the universe not adhering to logical explanations at one point. I simply don’t know.

Plenty of ways to miss the point

It is clear to me that SMS doesn’t understand the problem with supernatural explanations for things. So I will elaborate.

SMS claims that he has deduced a supernatural explanation, which is a personal, disembodied mind. He suggests that a personal, disembodied mind is logically possible. I don’t know that it is, but consider: it is logically possible that there are leprechauns playing gin rummy in my kitchen as I write this. I’m not really concerned with what is logically possible. I’m concerned with what is probable.

SMS then claims that he has deduced the existence of this personal, disembodied mind, so its existence is at least probable, and by eliminating other options, has come to the conclusion that there is a supernatural universe-sustainer at work.

I would bet dollars to donuts that SMS (and most theists) approached this argument with the possibility of supernatural explanations ringing in his ears. It is therefore easier for him to be accepting of those explanations when he “deduces” that a supernatural explanation could be the only one.

But – and as he has failed to clarify – what does it mean for something to be supernatural? He suggests that it simply means that a supernatural thing exists outside the sphere of naturalism. But what does that mean? The problem with supernaturalism is that you can literally use it to suggest anything. It is unfalsifiable, in the truly Popper-esque use of the word. SMS’s argument is completely unfalsifiable. He will argue that falsifiability is only relevant towards scientific claims, so he doesn’t have to contend with it because his conclusion is supernatural. But this is circular. How can he claim his argument doesn’t need to be falsifiable unless he knows what his conclusion is going to be at the end?

If we examine SMS argument, we find that he is comfortable with supernatural explanations because he feels like he has picked the best from a host of other explanations. Has he, though? Tell me, why is it we can only deduce supernaturalism, and not detect it? It is because, as SMS admits, supernaturalism is undetectable by natural means. Why then should we be able to deduce it? SMS claims that logic would apply to the supernatural, so his deduction is valid. How could he possibly know that? He is suffering from a large dose of confirmation bias. For all he knows, supernatural explanations are not deducible from logic. They can already violate cause and effect, time and space… why not logic? Why is logic special? A supernatural cause could be affecting all of the logic in the universe. Who knows? When you’re willing to grant magic powers authority, you can use them to say whatever you want. This is the problem with suggesting supernatural answers, and why supernatural explanations get laughed at.

SMS vigorously denies his abuse of probability. So I ask, What is more probable: that there is a fundamental aspect of the universe that we cannot explain yet (or may never explain) or that a supernatural, disembodied mind is running the show? SMS claims he is comfortable with his line of reasoning, that he is satisfied with it. Well I am not. Let us invoke the razor. We learn new things about the universe everyday. The simpler explanation is that we cannot explain certain things right now, and may not ever be able to explain them. To put it another way, the simpler explanation is that we don't have an explanation yet. I am perfectly comfortable with that. SMS says this universe demands an explanation, but more importantly that it demands one now. I remain unconvinced.

The Assumption of the Supernatural

Earlier I accused SMS of having a circular argument for deducing supernatural explanations. It seems to me that one first has to be willing to posit supernatural explanations in order to suggest they could exist in specific circumstances. In short, if you are predisposed to believing in supernatural things, this argument is easier to swallow. However, if you are not, the supernatural explanation is not the most probable. So, you cannot use the Cosmological argument as a way to deduce supernatural explanations. Supernatural explanations have to be plausible before you start. SMS thinks he has shown how they could be plausible. He claims that supernatural explanations would obey the laws of logic, but don’t have to obey anything else. So I would like to see a presentation of how this could be so. I would like, for example, to see an argument (deduction is fine) of something else that has a supernatural explanation. Because you have to admit, if supernaturalism is possible, we should be able to deduce it for other things, too.

For example, SMS says a disembodied mind is logically possible. I disagree. As we understand minds right now, they all require brains. SMS needs to offer an instance where this is not the case, or at least show us how it is logically possible that this is not the case. I assert again that all minds require brains. We have no evidence to the contrary on this matter. If he wants to claim that it is logically possible for minds to exist without brains, he needs to present an argument. If he wants to say they are possible in a supernatural realm, I will again point out the circularity here, since the supernatural explanation he has produced so far has only been deduced, and only been deduced at the end of his argument.

The topic of this debate was that SMS argument for god belief was idiotic. I still assert that it is, primarily because he thinks a supernatural disembodied mind is more probable of an explanation for the universe than something else we don’t yet understand that could be perfectly natural. Science is full of weird and as-of-yet unexplained phenomenon. Quantum mechanics is often used as a lazy way to posit wacky suggestions for things, and I studiously avoided bringing it up as a topic because it is easily abused. But I will suggest that SMS does some reading on the matter. It might open his eyes a little.

[.π.]

Disregard. Counted wrong. post is up. Moving into closing arguments.
Ty I unapproved your post for a moment. You are outside of the agreed on deadline.

SMS, if you would like to waive the deadline for this post I can reapprove it. Otherwise under rat ring rules this debate can be counted as forfeit and both members may start additional debates.

Originally Posted by SMS

Alright. However, I expect you to engage the premises of the cosmological argument rather than merely attack my conception of God. I suppose you don't need to, but it is what I am expecting. I also think our readers would be interested in reading that, too. I'd like to alter a few things:

1. 2000 words
2. 10 days to respond (I need to time. I am starting a new job, moving, etc)
3. 3 posts each
4. start date = I must post within 10 days from whenever we finally agree on the terms.
5. Extension time 2 days

I am fine with this:

Originally Posted by TySixtus

Okay. Start date is up to you.

[SMS]

The problem with SMS’s cosmological argument – or rather Gale and Pruss' argument – is, as I stated in my first post, it is nothing new. It fails for all the same reasons that the other cosmological arguments fail. Just because the facts of this universe could’ve been different, doesn’t mean the universe could have not existed.

I do not argue that the facts of the universe are contingent. I argue that some facts of the universe are contingent and that the universe itself is contingent. And I offered reasons to believe that if there are contingent facts of the universe, then the universe is also contingent. This argument can be found under the subtitle ‘A Cosmological Argument’ and ‘Is the Universe a Brute Fact’. This is the third time I have brought my argument to Ty’s attention; he has ignored it twice.

As with all the cosmological arguments, we are given a false dichotomy to choose from. Either the universe exists this way, or it couldn’t have existed at all. I’m not convinced that this is the case. For all I know, nothingness is impossible.

I already addressed this argument. My argument does not depend on nothingness being a possibility. It may well be that a universe is necessary but just not this universe. This follows from there being just one contingent fact about this universe.

This is a fundamental flaw in SMS’s argument. For all I know, no other universe but this one could’ve existed. I don’t have to present an argument for it in this debate.

But I have already given reasons to doubt that this is the only universe that could have existed since it –on my account and on my argument—entails that all of the facts are necessary. Why doesn’t Ty engage my argument? Does he really think he can ignore it?

Further, SMS claims that if the universe has no logically possible explanation, I have to present an argument.

That’s incorrect. What I said was that if Ty wants to claim that the universe has no explanation, then he is committed to the position that the universe has no logically possible explanation. But this is a heavy modal claim that needs argument since it conflicts with our modal intuitions.

But – and as he has failed to clarify – what does it mean for something to be supernatural? He suggests that it simply means that a supernatural thing exists outside the sphere of naturalism. But what does that mean?

Ty is confused. The word ‘supernatural’, as I have defined it, does not mean that a supernatural thing exists outside the sphere of naturalism. The word ‘supernatural’ has no existential commitment, Ty. All I said was that if anything is supernatural, then that thing possesses properties or existence outside the natural realm. This means that some or all nomological necessities need not apply to such a thing. I cannot put it anymore simpler than that.

The problem with supernaturalism is that you can literally use it to suggest anything. It is unfalsifiable, in the truly Popper-esque use of the word.

This is nonsense! On my argument, if a logical impossibility can be demonstrated in respects to my argument, then my argument has been falsified. I said that in my earlier reply!

SMS’s argument is completely unfalsifiable. He will argue that falsifiability is only relevant towards scientific claims, so he doesn’t have to contend with it because his conclusion is supernatural. But this is circular. How can he claim his argument doesn’t need to be falsifiable unless he knows what his conclusion is going to be at the end?

Because I readily admit that my argument is falsifiable, we can dismiss Ty’s above statement.

Tell me, why is it we can only deduce supernaturalism, and not detect it?

This assumes deduction is not a form of detection. Where’s that argument?

Let us invoke the razor. We learn new things about the universe everyday. The simpler explanation is that we cannot explain certain things right now, and may not ever be able to explain them.

Huh? The above is a simpler explanation for what? This “explanation” just asserts our epistemological limitations in offering explanations. It does not explain the collection of the contingent facts of the actual world. Hence, Ty is confusing what’s to be explained.

In any case, the razor is to be used as a preferential tool to select between equiprobable explanations. It is not a tool to select between explanations that are alleged to have non-equal probabilities. And since I argue that my explanation is the more probable explanation, it follows that Ty’s deployment of the razor is premature.

Why then should we be able to deduce it? SMS claims that logic would apply to the supernatural, so his deduction is valid. How could he possibly know that? He is suffering from a large dose of confirmation bias. For all he knows, supernatural explanations are not deducible from logic. They can already violate cause and effect, time and space… why not logic? Why is logic special? A supernatural cause could be affecting all of the logic in the universe. Who knows? When you’re willing to grant magic powers authority, you can use them to say whatever you want. This is the problem with suggesting supernatural answers, and why supernatural explanations get laughed at.

Ty’s thoughts are muddled. Even if supernatural beings can break the rules of logic, it does not mean that we cannot deduce them as causes. When we deduce a supernatural cause, we do not apply the laws of logic to that supernatural cause and demand adherence. All we do is infer the supernatural explanation as the only remaining disjunct from the competing disjuncts.
Ty’s second objection appeals to my treatment of logic as being applicable to the supernatural being. Ty asks why is that a supernatural being cannot break logical rules? The answer to this is that logical rules are the broadest of any type of possibility (other than some accounts of epistemic and doxastic possibility in the Cartesian sense but these are non-alethic.) that we know of.

Anyone who wishes to assert that a supernatural being could break the rules of logic is committing themselves to a range of possibility greater than logic. What such a range is and how such a person can speak coherently about it is not my problem since I believe there is no such possibility.

Earlier I accused SMS of having a circular argument for deducing supernatural explanations. It seems to me that one first has to be willing to posit supernatural explanations in order to suggest they could exist in specific circumstances. In short, if you are predisposed to believing in supernatural things, this argument is easier to swallow.

Ty has it backwards: It’s from the possibility of supernatural existents and explanations that I am willing—in principle—to posit supernatural explanations for some phenomenon.

However, if you are not, the supernatural explanation is not the most probable. So, you cannot use the Cosmological argument as a way to deduce supernatural explanations. Supernatural explanations have to be plausible before you start.

No, supernatural explanations need to be possible (not plausible) before I start. And that’s exactly what I did with the argument regarding disembodied minds. And from that point I deduced the supernatural explanation as the most probable among the competing explanations.

SMS thinks he has shown how they could be plausible. He claims that supernatural explanations would obey the laws of logic, but don’t have to obey anything else

I didn’t say that. I left it upon whether a supernatural being could disengage or violate metaphysical necessities.

Because you have to admit, if supernaturalism is possible, we should be able to deduce it for other things, too.

I see no reason to believe that. Even if it is true, what relevance would a second argument for the existence of a supernatural explanation have on the veracity of my present argument?

For example, SMS says a disembodied mind is logically possible. I disagree. As we understand minds right now, they all require brains. SMS needs to offer an instance where this is not the case, or at least show us how it is logically possible that this is not the case.

But why does Ty disagree? He doesn’t say. He just asserts that what we know about minds is that they require brains. This is no argument. And if Ty’s evidence is rooted within science, then he cannot claim that disembodied minds are logically impossible for two reasons: the first reason is that science does not address logical possibility of existents. This is a metaphysical issue. The second reason is that science is rooted within the natural world and does not extend itself to what is true about the supernatural. Hence, assuming Ty is talking from a scientific basis, then the basis of his “knowledge” about minds is irrelevant.

If he wants to claim that it is logically possible for minds to exist without brains, he needs to present an argument.

I presented an argument for why it was rational to believe that possibly disembodied minds exist. It was in my earliest writings. You need to address that.

[TySixtus]

I would be lying if I said I expected this debate to be more fruitful or produce some kind of useful nugget of information. Since this is the last post in the debate, I will answer some of SMS’s more serious charges, charges that when answered will show how his other objections/arguments hold no water.

I do not argue that the facts of the universe are contingent. I argue that some facts of the universe are contingent and that the universe itself is contingent. And I offered reasons to believe that if there are contingent facts of the universe, then the universe is also contingent. This argument can be found under the subtitle ‘A Cosmological Argument’ and ‘Is the Universe a Brute Fact’. This is the third time I have brought my argument to Ty’s attention; he has ignored it twice.

Well any reader will see that I have not ignored SMS’s argument. For example, he brushes off the universe as a brute fact because “P cannot explain itself”. In fact, the universe as a brute fact does explain itself. That’s precisely what the universe “as a brute fact” is meant to convey – that there may not be any satisfactory explanation, or even an unsatisfactory explanation, with regards to the existence of the universe.

This is why all of the cosmological arguments fail. We are given no good reasons to believe the universe requires sustainment of any kind. The requirement is asserted, and god is then posited as the originator and sustainer.

We are then subjected to “possible worlds” nonsense, once SMS realizes that nothingness – for all we know – is not possible. So he says things like this:

It may well be that a universe is necessary but just not this universe.

What is this supposed to mean? This is the only universe there is. There is no “this universe”. There is just “the universe”. Why should I entertain this “possible worlds” metaphysical nonsense when I’ve got one universe staring me in the face? It seems the only time this is useful is when someone needs to buttress a bad argument.

What I said was that if Ty wants to claim that the universe has no explanation, then he is committed to the position that the universe has no logically possible explanation. But this is a heavy modal claim that needs argument since it conflicts with our modal intuitions.

Once again, SMS is asserting I need to provide an argument if I want to claim the universe has no explanation.

Now I’m not claiming it has no explanation. I am merely claiming that is a possibility. Just as time and space don’t exist outside of the universe, neither does causality. It seems possible, then, that the universe is not subject to these things because they exist “inside” the universe. Asking for an explanation for the existence of the universe may very well be a nonsensical question.

I have to make no argument regarding “modal intuitions”. It seems fairly obvious that the existence of the universe might not be an answerable question, and might not be subjected to typical cause/effect/space/time properties that everything else is. Of course, the problem is that we don’t know. And I’m okay with not knowing. I see no need to insert a superstition into the works.

Ty’s second objection appeals to my treatment of logic as being applicable to the supernatural being. Ty asks why is that a supernatural being cannot break logical rules? The answer to this is that logical rules are the broadest of any type of possibility (other than some accounts of epistemic and doxastic possibility in the Cartesian sense but these are non-alethic.) that we know of.

Well, SMS is the one who started positing supernatural explanations for things. Just because he has claimed that supernatural beings are bound by logic doesn’t mean they would be. As I have repeatedly said, they might not be. Who knows? That’s the whole problem with suggesting supernatural explanations. You can use them to say anything you want. Supernatural beings could interrupt time and space, mess with causality… who knows? You are only limited by your imagination. Which is why they are worthless as explanations.

Here again:

All I said was that if anything is supernatural, then that thing possesses properties or existence outside the natural realm. This means that some or all nomological necessities need not apply to such a thing. I cannot put it anymore simpler than that.

Which ones, SMS? Which nomological necessities need not apply? How many? All of them? Just one? Five? You are saying that it’s possible for supernatural things to exist, and that in order for this thing to exist it must properties “outside the natural realm”. What does this mean? What does it mean for something to be “outside the natural realm”?

Ty has it backwards: It’s from the possibility of supernatural existents and explanations that I am willing—in principle—to posit supernatural explanations for some phenomenon.

I most certainly do not have it backwards.

Consider that SMS has to already think supernatural explanations are possible before he starts his cosmological argument. Otherwise, the cosmological argument is an argument for supernatural explanations.

But SMS has not shown how supernatural explanations for things are possible. In my very first post I charged him with providing some kind of argument for the supernatural possibility of things as explanations. He has studiously refused to do so. That is, ultimately, what this argument has boiled down to. If a person doesn’t believe in the supernatural, the cosmological argument doesn’t work. I think that is a pretty hefty weakness in the cosmological argument. Ergo, SMS should be providing us with an argument about the possibility (never mind probability) of supernatural explanations.

We can really see the failure of SMS’s argument when we see him talking about minds and brains. He claims I have no basis to refute the existence of disembodied minds, because they will be supernatural and not subjected to scientific inquiry. He then uses this assumption to buttress his cosmological argument.

He might as well suggest the existence of invisible chairs, or cars that can run on unicorn poop. After all, he suggests, any one of these things is not verifiable by science! He seems to think that this is beneficial to his argument, but the joke is on him. Everything we know about the concept of minds suggests they need physical brains. SMS can say “Well there could be a mind that is not embodied in a brain!” but we have no reason that this is correct. His reason? Well, his cosmological argument just happens to require this very thing. I do not have to point out how ridiculous his assumptions are.

All in all this debate has hinged on SMS’s positing supernatural explanations for things. He has failed to address how supernatural explanations are valid ones. Earlier I claimed his solutions were unfalsifiable, and he has tried to say that I misunderstood. I haven’t. Consider that SMS suggests disembodied minds could exist. When I ask how, he says they are supernatural. He believes that because he says they are supernatural, he doesn’t have to make a coherent argument as to how they could exist. He is effectively suggesting magic. When I ask for some explanation, keeping in mind that that what we know about minds and brains says the former doesn’t exist without the latter, he just throws his hands up in the air and shouts “Well they’re supernatural! I can’t explain it!” he then goes on to say that this perfectly reasonable explanation just happens to fit his conclusion that requires a disembodied mind.

I am not impressed. And I hereby repeat my charge that his argument for the existence of god is – at its core – utterly and completely idiotic.

[.π.]

This concludes the debate. Any further discussion should occur in the Rat Ring Gallery thread: http://talkrational.org/showthread.php?t=15131